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It is generally known that in the World War, the Allies 
d considerable success in reading the secret messages of the 
rmans while the Germans had eoual success in reading the sec-
et mes~ages of the Allies. A siudy of this subjec~ bfter_the War 
onvinced the Department that the Navy was overlook1ng an 1mport-
nt element of modern warfare, and, in 1923 there was established 
n the Code and Signal Section, of the Communication Division of 
he Office of Naval Operations, a desk known as the "Cryptography 
esk", or "Cryptography Section". I am here today to tell you of 
he functions and d~ties of this Section. 
The Cryptography Section begart actual work in February 
924. 
?be personnel of the Section consists of one officer and 
wo civilian cryptanalysts. Here I must explain a few technical 
erms in order that I may be understood. 
The work CRYETOGRAPHY is derived from the words CRYPTOS 
eanirtg HIDDEN or SECRET, and ~RAPHO meaning TO WRITE. Hence 
'CRYPTOGRAPHY" means SECRET WRITING and CRYP'l'OGRAPHER means "one 
ho writes in secret characters". ''CRYPT.'li~ALYSIS" is the an-
ysis of secret writing and a "CRYPTAUALYST" is "one who ana-
Jrses and reads secret messages. A "CODE" is a method of crypt-
graphy in which the words or phr~s!~ of the Elain te~t are treat-
d as units. A. "CIPHER" is a method of cryptography in which the 
'ndividual letters of the plain text are treated as units. A 
'C1\YP.20G ,_\lvl " is a code message or a cipher message or a message in 
n. kind of secret ch~racters. 
The cryptograph~r section has five distinct functions. 
FIRST ]'UlJCTION OF ~HE CRYPTOGRAPHY SECTION IS RESEARCH VIORl~. 
This research r;ork is the most important V'J Ork of the sect-
on. It is the basis of all our other work and the foundation of 
ur war-time cryptographic activities. We are making scientific 
tudies of our codes, our ciphers, and our methods fo eliminate 
11 weaknesses; we are studying new cipher systems, particularly 
ipher machines, in the hope of adopting systems superior to 
hose the Navy now employs; and we are working out the best meth-
ds of attack on codes and on all knoVJn cipher systems, for poss-
ble use in war. 
I cannot, in one lecture describe all methods elliployed by 
ryptanalyst s, but I can explain some of the more simple ones. 
The principles of cipher solution are usually very simple, 
lthough the application of these principles is sometimes quite 
ifficul t. 
Our methods of attack fall into three classes: 
( 1) Mathematical solut ions; 
used rrainly in the solution of complex 
cipher systems. 
( 2) "Guessing" or assuming values: 
Used mainly in code solution. 
(3t Automatic so~utions; 
which are possible in certain in-
stances. 
solutions are based on the fact that languages have ~"--'-~;:;-n::.....:..::p::...e=~c:.:..=._ iari ties which are fairly consistent in a large amount 
est, and on the fact that in almost ivery c~pher system there 
a mathematical relationsh!_E between t 1e various p3.rts of th~ 
her. The "mechanics" of each moa ern langu.age have been stua-
d and tabulated. 
Plate No. 1 
is diagram is called a "Repetition Table". It shows how often 
ters of English text repeat themselves at various intervals. 
repetition of letters on place removedt shown in column 3 like 
E' s in "TrlERE, or the A's in "PH.UAMA'' are twice a.s fre quent 
doub.le letters shown in column 2. The repetitions of letters 
placed removed, shown in column 4, like the T' s in "TElJT'' are 
e highest of all. 
This diagram c.ppears insignificant, yet, it was. the basis 
successful attack and mathematic~l Jolution of one Of the 
complex types of machine ~i~her ever invented. 
Plate No. 2· 
is diagram has four FRE~UEUCY l'ABLES; 
( 1) One for normal English. 
( 2) One for tale gra:phic English. 
( 3) One for French, and 
( 4) One for German. 
sbows the relative frequency of occurence of the various let-
s. In each table "E" is the big he st value. 
In English, the letters A-E-d-I-N-0-R-S and T are of high 
eqnenc~wbile the letters J K Q X and Z are of very low fre-
quency. 
The frequency table is the basis of the attack on ordinary 
Substitution ciphers. The highest cipher letter is assumed to be 
:.', the second highest "T", "0", ".A" or "Ii" et cetera, trying 
out various possibilities till we get intelligible test. In a 
very long message, the highest letter would be "E", the ne:;:rl :1:._ 
tt.e next ~ et cetera. 
Plate No. 3. 
is diagram has a frequency table of tbe pairs of letters in the 
ish language; a list of the most frequent bi-grapbs; and a 
st of the most frequent tri-graphs. In cipher solution we de-
d on these combinations more than we do on the frequencies of 
e ind i v id ua 1 letters. 
Certain letters have certain "AFFINITIES". 
we expect to find a "T" before ~and an "E'' 
~ see an "0,., we expect to find an "H" after it. 
:.·•, we eA}lect to find an "E" either before it or 
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after it. 







l?l:J.te No. 4. 
--
I will now show you how ~ simple cipher rue ssage is solved. 
s message (at the top) was Ql,e of five messages submitted by 
he inventor of a "Cipher Attachment'' for a typewriter. 
On the left is a norn:al Bnglish frequency table and a list 
of the most freyuen t bi- graphs and t ri-graphs. 
On the right is the frequency table of the message with a 
ondensed table of repeated bi-graphs and tri-gra.phs. 
By comparing the frequency table of the m~sage with the 
1ormal frequency table, we can see that only one alphabet was used 
to encipher the message. By further comparison, we can o-otain the 
values of several of the cipher letters. 
V - the most frequent letter, is probably "E" 
/JJV - looks like a good "'l'HE", so "X" is "T", and "D" 
is "H" 
VC & I.JV - make a good "ER" & "REn, so ''C" is "Rn 
XER.lf - coming at the ena of two ~fJords, mg,kes a good 
"T ION" so "E" is "I", "R '' is "0'", ;:t.nd 
"H" is ''N". 
he word spacing rm.de solution very simple. 
This is a typical solution of a simple cipher; that is. 
cipher using only~ e~ciphering alphabet. 
The solution of a compl~ cipher (that is, a cipher using 
eeveral enciphering alphabets) varies mainly in that we must first 
~solve the message into its original alphabets, and then solve 
o.ch alphabet. 
Since this cipher was the product of a machine, it was 
pacted thi::~.t the alphabet was ller·ived by slidfg a sequence of 
letters a ainst_ itself. Such a sequence-rs nown as a PRIMARY 
H.:~BET. 
lrhe first deciphering alphabet shown bad the cipher values 
ranged i~ alphabetical order. We found it possible to reur-
range this deciphering alphabet so that both the cipher values 
b.nd the plain text values would be tn the same order. I will not 
attempt to explain hov1 it was done. You can see the results • 
.O th deciphering alphabets are equivalent and will decipher the 
message. The seql~nce 
Y-Z-S-G-1>1-D-H-1!- (~-U -B-W-J -V -E-I-C-R-0-X-T-P-Z-F-L-A 
cis the PR Uih!tY .A.Ll?HA.BET. 
Plate No. 5. 
(rhe other messages can be read almost autornatically, once we have 
derived the Priroo.ry Alphabet, by a process known as "running down 
'the o.l p habet " . 
11e write out the first twnety or thirty letters of each 
message on a line. and below each letter we copy the sequency of 
~he Primary Alphabet. 
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English text will appear automatically on one line . 
In me~aage number four, z cipher is N plain, so we can set 
our two sequences with z ag.J.inst rr a.nd decipaer the rest of the 
message from this decipherin~ alph~bet . 
In message nruuber five , Q cipher is T plain, and we can j.:;ciph-3r the rest of the n1es~age in simile.'I' manner . 
~he ''rum1inR down" pro cess is a very valuable principle of 
~Typtan:llysis. It can sometimes be used for the solution of mess-
..,r:;.-;P wllich cc:Ln be solved in :10 other way. 
_ _ P1 a te No . 6. 
~Je will now take up another epplication of the "running 
---l!·.wr T, :,>rocess. 
This is a ciphering typewriter and a nee sage writ ten by it . 
·r,w inventor spent over ten ycar3 perfecting this ~chine. It 
took us less than two hours to break the message. 
~~e typewriter was built on the principle of the old 
Blicke!1sder:fer t ypewriter. :nseead of hu.ving independent type-
bars it had a Single rotating type- wheel. Pressing a ltey rot a ted 
the t;vpe wheel a certain number of spa ces, to the proper letter. 
Tho ci-phering r.~..~.echani sm imra rted Br1 erratic auxiliary motion to 
the ty~e-wheel ~hich was independent of the rotation produced by 
striking th'9 type-wri t:ter ke;)·· Honce , if we struck T any letter 
of the W.ph.:lbet might be written. 
The me chine had or.e fatal d eieat; the t ype -wheel sequence. 
could not be cha nged. Once t his sequence was obtained, any mess-
ll.go of u.verage length could be solved. 
':.{te cipher rr.es sage was e;opied, all on a single line , and 
we "ran down 11 this message with the type-wheel sequence . 
You saw in a previous diagrc.m how we "ran dovm" the mess-
age and read the English text along a stright line. 
Plate No .. '1 
When this message is "run.-down'' the English text does not 
~ppear in a straight line , but follows an erratic pattern. This 
JU ttern, hO'Never , repeats itself every 15 letters and thus checks 
the accuracy of assumptions. 
It required considerable skill and considerable patience 
to pick up t h e pa ttern, but it tool( lass than two hours to do it. 
\"J e do not ha ve to follow this laborious process to read the 
whole message. Once the pa ttern has been established, we c a n 
slide two strips against ea ch other , followi??g t he motion of the 
Jlattern. and decipher the me a sage directly. 
Pla te No. 8 
This shows the translation o:f the IIBesage, and the two 
strips set for deciphering the first letter. 
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I hcve slxnvn a mathematical. solution and an automatic 
olut ion. 
It is possiole to solve a. :3imple cipher message without the 
id of frequency tc.tl bes, _provided '1e ca!l correctly ~ess one word 
n1:c;.ined in the :nFlS~a;ge. !n ~ c1phers, anr-in a 1 codes, this 
tbe only possiblf;j nethod of solution. 
Plate No. 9 
J::Iere is an '=ldvan c_ed problem not of the July bullet in and 
ts frequency teble. l'he highest value t "E'' is 110 t n:s''. In 
t:: t t be re is net a sinGle "'B" in the message. One o'f£icer sol ve.d 
cryptogram without d~ff.:culty in less than an hour. He as- ·· 
d that the suoject ~oncerned ciphers and that the word "CRYP'l'~ 
Y" would appear. He wrote the word "CRYPl'OGR."JlHY" on a slip 
er, and slid the paper along till he found a place where 
· iOG R....PrlY" fit ted • 
e sbO'.v two placed where it does not fit and the correct place . 
. e values th:1s deri,;ed were filled in, and the solution \'t'as com-
leted by filling in the skeletons of words. 
Chief .:Petty Officer solved this cipher by assUIJ:ing that the last 
vc +etters in the me3sage were "ATION1'. 
Plate No. 10 
The B~ttle Fleet Cipher, used in U. S. Fleet Problem No. 5, 
solved by an applicntion of this principle. 
This plate shows the cipher. It consisted of seve~al Dltm-
cal running keys. designated by indicators, a nd several al-
abets designated by numerals. 'The plain te...ct was written in 
oups of 5 letters, the alphabet number was written over each 
up, and the 5 letters of a group wera enciphered by this al-
__ ·bet. 
_____ P=late No. 11 ____ _ 
This shows a message deciphered by this cipher. 
Plate l~o. 12. ~.::;___ _ 
This shows all the messages in this cipher submitted to the 
vy Department fo1 a ttack, and their fi na.l solutions. The let-
ers and numbers indexed each group for reference. 
Pl:1te No. 13 _.:::;...::;.__ _ 
1"his shows oertain peculiarities in the ciphe:- taxt. 
The word "kiS!?I SS I PPl" com~romised the system. The f our 
nations shm·m could not possibly be .J.11Y word e ~<:cept "HISS-
SIPPI". They showed that each group of five l e tters was en-




''1~1ISSI33IPPI" gave the skeletons of some of the alphabets. 
Tben we noted "QTAAT" at t'Pe beginning of the first message~ We 
ascmmed that this word was ".E'OLLO-wing". That was checked 1n 
8"" 0ther place. We tried these 'Values througbo"U.t our text and _ 
1 f :t.aally picked up an ''- -ONG", which we assumed was part o:f '' LO!~G.,. 
IlJDB". We filled in t'he approxima. te longitude and got many new 
values. Then we wanted a "L\.'riTUDE" and found one. 
1nother message be gan with peculia:r l19 t ter combinations 
th at fitted the words 11 R~ND~ZVOUS IATITU DI:'· . 
In twelve days we solved the entire se-ries o:f n.essP.ges. 
Our assumptions we:re not always corrcot. Here are some of 
our incorrect guesses, and the correct vaJ.ues. lf we had gues:::;ed 
correctly every time. or hc.d we had more material to check 'Ql;lr 
gues~es, the solution WO~oi..ld have required only two or th~· ee days. 
A cipher of the sar.1e type was use:i in the "Jolnt .Army-Navy 
'f~o";)J.c.m No. 3". With the experience gained in solving the 
Eat·cle Fleet Ci-pher. with a force of ten or twelve assistants, 
a.nd \''ith forty or fifty messages for attack, such as were actual-
ly available during the Hawaiian mane~vers, we could have solved 
this cipher in 24 hours. .b.nd once we had solved the cipher we 
~0u 1 c1 t'ead · sub::>e que:ut message::3 faster than the legi tirua te ad-
d 1·e q.o= t.. e. 
Plate No. 14. 
As we recovered cipher va~ues we put them on strips, the 
cipher letter on top, corresponding English values below. 
This enabled us to examine possibilities and to pick out 
skel~tons of \vords without having to write down the different 
values. 
Plate No. 15. 
Here is a message solved by the strips. Once the alpha -
bets were recovered we could read messages almost automatically. 
In fact, .much easier and faster than the legitimate addressees. 
We could read messages by the strips in half the time required to 
decipher it by the cipher. 
Plate No. 16. 
We do not solve every cipher . stem submitted to the sec-
tion. here is a cryptogra m which proved impregna le. Accor ng 
to its imentor, it is "mhe Decl a rJ.tion of Independence" - 1339 
words with the na.nes of its 56 signers, cu.pitaliz.ation £~.nd punct-
uation inaicated, keyed with 
( 1) A study of high finance, 
( 2) A study of love av.d devotion, 
(3) a history of successful effort. 
It had 8000 words in ell t_.S;onta.i ned in 1636 characters. It is the 
Decl ?rat ion of Ind ependenc:.:e enciphered three times aver, e a.ch 
time with a different key. v'/e worked on this a week without sue ... 
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cess fnJ then gave it up. A little later the inventor ?arne tori 
V'ashir.gton to explain his cipher. After listening to. bl.S ctesc inp-
tion v:e ·.\ere convinced that this cryptogrum could ea~nl~ c~nta 
.all . the woL·d~ ha cla.im~d for it~ Th~ syste!f h~~ .on1~n~,---E~as 
pac!_ ·· t'1e l.nventor h:J.mself, wl.th tne key 1.n nl.~ pos ... ess1on, w 
una ole to _dcci -ohe r a single worD.:. 
I sh~l~ now t~e up the subject of coaes. 
'I'he breaki1:g of codes is quite aiffe::er.;.t !'rom ~he. so~u-. 
tion of ciphers. All codes are IJIU.Ch 9like c:~.nd t~1e pr::.ncl:fal.dlf-
ferences fonnd are due to peculiarities of g!'ummar of vo.rl.OUb 
lc .. n gu. ages. 
I vJ ill show the standard way of breaking a code, taking ~aval 0ode 3-4 as an e~an·.ple. This code is being attacked by th~ 
class in ''Advanced Crypt£..nalysis 11 at the ~avy Departn:ent. One o~ 
the ci"\'" ilia~ .. c1·yptana1ysts is assisting in this attack, b'U.t I am 
not pa~ticiputing. 
ActuaJ. c>ttn.•;k beg&r. on 12 Oc-+·ober :i923 · The st:A.dont 
1Jr,rptan1.lj•st'3 have or..ly worked four hou.rs a dn.y on the code, so pr.ig~ces~"J ha<J been s~ower than normal. For material v•e tuok all t~e Coao ~-4 rr.Gssages aent or received b;:v. the JJavy Departr::ent 
from 15 Augu:::H 1925 to 30 Sep terr.ber 1925. Code S-4 was ~elected 
c:e :raly becc.:..use more I!lessELees c:;~.re sent in that Code t h~.n 1.n all 
ethers combined and it was thus II!Uch easter to get the necessary 
ammAnt of ma.t erial. 
Jn~s':' P:DCESS 
--------
.0 3fo:re d'!..Y other wl)rk can be Jane on a code it is neces-
sary to sort out, frorn the rr.a.ss l)f mu.teri.il sent in by t"!"le var-
ioua intercept ::ot&tions, ..U.l t~e mes8e.ges in the.t code. This 
process is genera-lly laborious, &.nd sometiues rP.quires e.A.,8T-
ience and tik:tll ::;f the hig1 est order. This sortjng ~ut process 
was done :.?or U3 ty .ti1c .Ihp: rtmP.nt Codir.g O:&:'ficerR. ie coJ.ld not 
sparo t"!:8 -iwP. to sv rt c;.~. t the Code :S r.:e ssac;es from (.loll tl.1e 
"O d~•.1 n.s~Jr gee sent ::u1d re~ei ved at the D.Jrc;.rt~ner..t; 
SECOjJJ ?FDnl:ss 
The mess.:lges, a1·r£~ed in ctronulotz:.(.;el order, are UOJ;ied 
~n COlumn form On 8" X 13" stene.:l, ea.ch code gro'11p being in-
dEuced for ft:.ture refeTer.ce. !!'row tae3e stl3l1Cils t.re -p7:epared our 
work-she€te. The \o:-or~: sheatc are mi~eo~r'lp'!1ed so each cryp· .. -
an~ly8t can have a.r~ "origi. nal o opy" ·Nhi ch w:"..J.l star:d repeated er-
aslng 
~BIRD PROC.3S8. 
A ca:td is then prep].red fo:- eg.ch code-gronp. This card 
shows the two praced~nr, code ... grou:ps, the two follo,~·in6 code-groups, 
and the indez n~mber. 
I 
1?lnte l~o. 18 
3'0C:.I'H Pb.OG~BS. 
~he n?x~ steJ; is the mc.king of a •·n:a.nnscript''. .L1his m£:.nu-
sc.ript J.S no .;hl.ug more nor letis thw tht: recopying of ~he cards 
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after the cards have been essorted in the al¥habetical 9rde! of 
the code-groups in the cen:er of the card. he manuscr1pt 1s. ~de simply for convenience in handling, und in order to obta1n a 
graphic frequency of the co de-groups. The cards themselves may 
be used instead of the manuscript, but the latter has prov~n to 
be the more convenient method. The 11ma.nuscript 11 is also m1meo-
. phed. 
Thus far the work is purely mechanical and can be done b~r 
clerks or yeomen. This mechanical work, however, is &.. very lab-
crious pr~ess. 
Plate No. 19. 
---=-
.FIFTH PROCESS 
v:hen the manuscript is finished it is given to the ''code-
breakers" for study in conjunction with the messages themselves 
now tru.nacribed on the work-sheets. In the majority of cases much 
long and patient study is required before v~lues can be assumed 
by the "Code-breuker11 • :Punctuation marks, (periods especially); 
common short wo1·ds, such as ''the", ''and,., "Of'', "for", "but", 
et cetera are the points of attack usually selected by the 
"Code-Breaker". The subtle ment~;.l process by whicb he arrives 
at these ~alues is one that would be difficult, if possible, to 
descri be• To the average layman, the process· appears to be not 
unlike "Black ''Jiapic''; whereas assumptions are mad,e, or arrived at, 
by the application of the purest lo~ic reenforced by long exper-
ience in the studf of codes and stu y and observation of the 
peculiarities of the language C and of the individual officer who 
drafted and coded the mess~ges). 
The discovery of ..9..1'1!!. code-group which stood for ''AND" was 
fairly simple. The munuscript for DAN.EJ is shown. DANEJ oc-
cured 28 tjmes - the most frequent group we had. It had not a 
,ingle reuetition among the groups preceeding it or ~ong the 
groups following it. It did not occur~ at th~ be~inning of a 
message, at the _end of a message, or ~ the beg1nning or end of 
a message. It !£ad to be a con,junction, am a conjunction of very 
igh freq u..e ncy. Obviously it was .L"'lD· I knov1 it was AND be-
ffiuse I looked in the code-book. Tget more enjoymentfrom this 
attack than the officers working on the code because I can check 
up all their wild guesses, and I can watch them struggling wi tb 
What I know to be an incorrect assumption until they finally dis-
cover their error. 
BACUS is obviously a dumm:y:. No word in the English lang-
uage can, out of 10 occurrences, appear 3 times as the first word 
of a message, once as the second word and once as the last w~ ~his ass~mption is further j~stified ~hen we know that present ' 
1nstruct~ons call for using dummies freely near the beginning am 
the ending of o. message. 
Plate No. 20 
This plate shows a spelling indicator HINAP and a spelling 
group ~YSI~. The word which was spelled out 6 times exactly the 
same way is ''RODGERS~'. HIJ!.fl..P began 4 different repeated series of 
code-groups. QYSIJ 1s obv1ously a spelling graup. 
These examples are given merely to show the reasoning pro-
cess of the "Code-breaker". It is not unlike luark Twain's des-
-8-
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cription of Adam's naming the animals. Adam told Eve that he 
named the long-legged, lonc-neclced animal ~rfira£fe 11 because it 
ooked li.&<:e a giraffe. The inference must not e made, however, 
hat the ''Code-breaker" has simply to study the code groups and 
thereby make correct assumptions in every case. Many an assumpt-
ion proves incorrect and involves much labor in the process of 
correction, as it has to be erased from every work-sheet on which 
it appears. As each assumption is made it is written in the 
work-sheet opposite its code-group. The index numbers enable the 
arious code groups to be located without difficulty. "Tenta-
tive" assumptions are entered on the work-sheets in light pencil, 
easily erased. "Good" assumptions a .re entered in heavy p3ncil. 
"Proved" or "sure" values are entered in colored pencil or red 
ink. 
IXTH PROCESS 
As VJe assume values and fill in these values throughout our 
work-sheets, sentences, or parts of sentences appear, which not 
nly prov~ our assumptions, but enable us to make further assumpt-
ions to fill in gaps. 
The following plates show four messages which filled in 
sufficiently to allow us to complete them: 
Plate No. 21 Plate No. 22 
Plate No. 23 Plate No. 24 
EN'i'H PROCESS: 
The seventh process is the search for "easy breaks". It 
is carried on concurrently with all the previous steps. In fact, 
certain breaks are obvious from an inspection of the message 
lanks and are utilized before the work-sheets, cards, or manu-
script are prepJred. 
Plate No. 25. 
This shows one of the best breaks we have found to date. 
~he coded message shown was sent on October 14th. On October 16th 
the following message was sent in pluin language: 
FROM U S S TENNESSEE TO SECNAV 
1016 RF..F MY 1014 1310 PERIOD CORRECT ADD!\ESS HEXT 
OF kiN OF WILLIAM SCHEFLER SE~~~ SECOND DECEASED 
dHOULD :b:S \lUOTE ADOL:PH ShEFLSR ONE ]'OUR THREE SILVER 
AVEHlJE SAN FRANCISCO CALIF UN~UOTE 1620 
~he plain language message referred to a coded message. You can 
see Vlha t it did to the code. 
Plate No. 26 
The infornation concerning the subject matter of this 
message w~s derived from a newspaper article. 
-9-
( 3988) 
l:'late No. 2'1 
The subject metter of this message was assumed from the 
~lain text inserted in the beginning of the coded message. 
Plate No . 2§ 
From the fact that this message was addressed to the Scout-
ing Fleet and from the known movements of the Scouting Fle-et, we 
assumed the t the words "HAITI" and "SCOUT! NG FLEET" would appear 
in this message. ·· e found them. 
IGHTH PROCESS 
Cedes are broken for the sake of getting the information 
contained in current, important, enemy messages. Therein the 
Naval Commander differs from the true cryptanalyst who care not. 
bow ancient or unimportant a message ~ be so long as he can d1g 
out some scrap of information. By the time a code is broken, the 
lnformation contained in the work-sheets is generally too old to 
be of military value. As soon t:~.s a code is partially reconstruct-
ed, the values of the various code-groups are listed on cards and 
a "RECONSTRUCTED DECODE" is prepared. Copies of the "RECOlrSTRUCTED 
!)ECODE" are furnished to Task Force Commanders in order that they 
~y decode enemy messages as soon as intercepted. ' Copies of all 
intercepted messages are forwarded to the ''code-breakers'', who 
continue their labors until the enemy ceases to use the code. 
!rhe Reconstructed Decode" is revised at frequent intervals. 
Here is the RECONSTRUCTED DECODE of Naval Code E-4 
Plate o. 29 
PlAte No. 30 
i .i:o:. 
Plate No. 31 
On 4 December, the day on which this slide was prepared, 
too student cryptanalysts had 277 sure values and over 500 ten-
tative values which had not been proven. Today. a week later, 
hey have over 500 sure values, and about 600 tentative values. 
The breaking of a code is slow work at first, but when the 
code does finally yield it crumbles fast. 
'THE SECOND FYNC TION OF THE CRYPTOGRAPHY SECTION I:S PLANNING. 
We know t ha. t in case of war the enemy will use 'Codes and 
ciphers to protect his secret messages. Everyone will a.gree that 
we must intercept and read these messages if it is humanly poss-
ible. The problem is "How can this be done?". 
This problem must be worked out by the Cryptography Section 
itself; no higher authority or no other organization can be of any 
assistance. 
V'e must find the correct answers to these questions: -
( l) What part did Cryptanalysis play in the ~Vorld War? 
( 3988) 
( 2) What part will Cryptanalysis play in the ne_.o;t war? 
( 3) Wh&t are the posoibili ties of Cryptanalysis? 
( 4) What are the limitations of (.;ryptanalysi.s? 
( 5) What personnel will be needed ahd where will they 
be obtained? 
(6) What material will be needed? 
(?) What organization is needed? 
(8} What assistance can be given the field cryptographic 
units by the Cryptography Section at the Navy 
~partruent? 
The problem of planning is so involved, and so little re-
liable information is available that present solutions are only 
tentative. None of our plans have been approved am nothing can 
be regarded as final. 
( 1) - Wliat part a ia Cryptanalysis pl<-Y in the World war? 
I will quote from Lord l!'isher' s book - "I.~emories" - Chaptel" 
VIII, "The !JavaJ. War Staff": -
"The First Sea Lord and the Chief Admiral afloat have 
act to be Siamese twins. And when the war comes, the 
Naval War Staff at the Admiralty. listening every mo-
ment to the enemy's wireless messages (if he dare use it), 
enables the First Sea Lord to let his twin at sea know 
exactly what is going on. He takes in the wireless, and 
not necessarily the Admiral afloat, on account of the 
far greater power of reception in a land installation as 
compared with that on a ship. When you see that spider's 
web of lines of wire on the top of the Admiralty, then 
thank God this is more or less a free country, as it got 
put up by a cloud of blue .. jackets before a rat was smelt! 
An intercepted German No.val letter at the time gave me 
personally great delight, for it truly divined that wire-
less was the weapon of the strong Navy .. _ For the develop-
ment of the wireless has been su. ell that now you can get 
the direction of one who speaks and go for him: so the 
German daren't open his mouth. But if he does, of 
course the message is in cipher; AND IT'S THE ELUCIDATION 
OF THA~ CYPHER WHICH IS ON3 OF THE CR07..NING GLORIES OF 'l'HE 
ADMIRALTY iVORK IN THE LATE WAR. IN MY TIME 'lHtx NEVER 
FAILED ONCS IN T:tLiT ELUCIDATION. . 
In a lecture on ciphers before the ]'ranch General Staff, 
9olonel Givierge recently st&ted:-
"ln other domains, for the Air Service and the Navy, for 
the progress of events upon certain distant theatres of 
war, ne found in the hostile communi ca tiona inforrmtion 
which, for the past at least, were always truthful, ob-
tained without risk of human lives, without expense, ancl 
with a speed and surety that no other intelligence organ-
ization was able to equal. 
He also stated in this lecture: 
"The manoeuvre that led to the vioto ry of Tanneberg at 




memoirs am boasts of it. he is not wrong; it is one of 
the finest operations of the war. But there is o~e. 
detail that he does not tell, that singularly fac1l1ta~ed 
his task. He knew the Russian cipher~ all the orders 1n 
the armies of his adversaries were transmitted by wire-
less telegraphy, he kept deciphering them and he tnew 
them as early as did their executants. Every night the 
intercepted radios were deciphered about eleven o'clock. 
'i'hey used to take them to Ludendorf who would draw up 
his own orders accordingly. \"lhenever, exceptionally. 
there was some delay, be would arrive ill at ease at the 
Cipher Office to lmow the cause of it". 
The United States severed diplomatic relations with Ger-
~ny in 1917; one of the contributory causes being the publica-
tion of the Zimmerman telegram to the German Minister in Mexico. 
The translation of this telegram, which was sent in the Germ~n 
diplomatic code. was the work of the P~dio Intelligence Sect1on of 
the British Admiralty. The Germans had sent this message by three 
routes to insure its delivery. It was sent by wireless from 
•auen to Sayville; it was sent by the Swedes via Stockholm ~nd 
uenos Aires; and it was also trans~\tted directly by cable 
through the courtesy of the American State Department. The 
British Intelligence Service intercepted the code message on each 
of these routes, thereby getting it before it reached 1~exico,ana 
also boug'ht a copy of 'the code message in Mexico City. 
The Radio Intelligence Section of the Admiralty supplied 
Jellicoe with information concerning the movements of the German 
Fleet at Jutland from the time the German Fleet got underway un-
til it had returned to German Waters. Had Jellicoe taken advan-
age of this information he could have turned Jutland into a sec-
ond Trafalgar. The German E'leet never got underway a single time 
during the World \'Jar without the fact being known in advance by 
the British Admiralty. 
We also have valuable information in U.s. ;.rmy reports. I 
will quote froo "The History and Principles of German Liili tary 
Ciphers", by J. Rives Childs, lst Lieutenant, U.S. Arm;v. 
" - - - On May 27, 1918, the Second Battle of the trJ.B.rne 
began in a major offensive by the Germans. On May 31, 
Junel, and June 2, Captain Painvin, the celebrated French 
cryptanalyst, solved the "keys" for May 28, May 30, and 
June 1, and read about 300 messages from the German Div-
ision, Corps, and Army Headquarters. From information 
contained inncertain of these messages a heavy German at-
tack which had been planned in the region of Montdidier 
was thwarted. Captain Fainvin was later awarded the Cross 
of the Legion of Honor for his distinguished services11 • 
Perhaps the most brilliant exPloit of the Radio Intelli-
gence was its contribution to the success of American arms at 
Saint Mihiel. 
It ~as toward the end of the second week in September. 
1918. TI1e American First Army w~s in its sector opposite De-
achment "C", General Foch 's Army, had received and trained the 
necessary replacements, had brou@lt up enormous quantities of am-
munition of all calibres and was in every respect ready to stage 
a "show" intended to reduce the Saint Mihiel salient. 
The day before the proposed attack. information brought 
ba?k by p~trols and gathered from other sources was taken by cer-
taln sect1ons of the general staff to indicate that a general 
withdrawal of the German forces had occurred the previous evening 
At a conference hurriedly held by General Pershing with his • 
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hiefs of staff, the Commander-in-Chief was urged by a~most every 
present to eall off the att~ck as the terrific artlllery bar-
es which were scheduled were likely to result in only a need~ 
ess vraste of awmunition. He \Vas advised that it would be better 
to wait ancl occupy the salient later when all German foro~s. had 
been withdrawn. There was only one sharply dissenting op1n1on 
from this judgment and t!'lat was given by the Chief of the_ Ra?.,io 
t"'llige11oe of the ~,irst Arm.v. This one declared thct frcm ·- ~b­
·-JlW"'._. ... qns -gat.her~d J_9y w;·.:r.el~~~~;;~~ .was evident tnat the Gezmans e,:h.~u(:l.ted tht;j satlent. 
Code ~essages h~d been intercepted by the American radio 
redd as follows: 
"To station ~D:P. Nothing new or interesting here. 
holding fast. ~lP'. 
Still 
It was froffi suet messages as this and from deductions 
~ased upon exchb.nges of other messages that th~ Radio Int ell i-
ce Section was able to inform General Parsb1ng that the enemy 
ad not withdro.wn,and that, therefore, the attacl: should to.ke 
ace as previously nlanned. It did. The result needs no cem-
ent." 
The resul. te aohieved from Cryptanal;,tsis. from the Service 
of Radio InteLt:.~E:tl'}d ~ d UJ: ing the ~orJ..d War, w~re f a r z:uora im-
ortant, f.:r:-C'm a rnj.l;_"';. p.:::y standpoint, than the n ccom::;>J. ;. !:)r.ments of 
~ny other organ~zation of equal size. 
12) :vhat ·part will Crypta.nal ysia pl§Y in the next war? 
All na t1. ons have lea1·ned the lessons of ·the ~''otld :var and 
11 proba~ly make evP.n greateT efforts to inta~cept end read 
nemy messa ges in tha futu :re than were made 111 the past. If the 
sul ts do not Jat:a~·~re up ·~ o those of the World v7ar it will be 
ecau se the Defensi-\r e lv1ea sures have been ir.Iproved ~nd ~JS terns of 
~ gher security tl:.an those used j n the Wor:'..d WaT h ~ ve been 
Mopted. Both Cryptography and Cryptanalysis will be consider-
~ly advanced by the next war. It is the eternul contest between 
e gun and armor~ between the offense and defense, a contest 
rich is never definitely decided. In a \1ar between nations of 
pproximately equal strength, Rudio Intelligence co11ld easily be-
~me the decisive fantor. 
(.3) - v~n'l·~ era i.he "P.0&§.ib .i li tics of Crypt.~n a lysi~ 
. I~ is P"s:iiJ~.e, i-: .~u.r Radio Intelligance O:rgar..ization has 
a suff1 c1.ent nunit-er of ~l{:t. ~.lcd c ryptu.:1.alyut s anC. inc l udes a few 
remuse.s. t c l'i:jatl every mi2ssage sent by the enE:'IIlY during the 
ourse of the wf!.r. The Se rvice cf !tadio Ir.te].ligence can furnish 
o:rmation wh.t.oh ?an be . &cqu:i. rAd 1.::1 1~0 other ws.y. It :n;.~t prove 
"be cat~~1._..;.t §£_Y v a)..tl.e th:an c.ur entire S~Jou tin~ ]1 .eet. 
- Wha .t: a1"e tr.e :'. ~. !:!ita:t. jons of Cr:vptanalyeis? 
. sr~·rtc~lalys.iH and Radio Intelligence are extremely uncer-
ln. ·•f3. cu.nr•.ot prodict that 'i'Je will decipher a. certain· number of 
seage~ 1.r. c:1e day or that we wl11 read s. message in a cert3.in e~ of ILlrllltf.s clfter ~. t i~ ir.tercE~pted. If t,he ene!Dy does not 
h1s radio we n.~nn~t ~opy his m3ssages; if he uses highly com-
ex c1pher syGte:nu We I.Oay be unable to solve them; if he uses 
: codes.correot~y we may require such a long time to break them 
h::.t the 1nforr.ua.t1on will be of little value. It is possible for 
~necy to use sy~tems of cr~rptography which are imfJragnable to 
tteck. Such system~ ha~e not been used in the psst, mainly be-~se they ~r~ too d1fficult_ and too slow in operation, but we 
annat say "ho.t ~Jst ems of aosol ute security will not be used in 
e future· Our success will a epend in a large part on the er-
5) -
carelessness, ~nd overconfidence of the enemy. These are 
t s over vm ich we ho.v e no control. 
My estimate of the minimum required is: 
32 cryptanalysts, 
Jill th 
44 communication, watch, und coding officers, 
48 t ran Slti. tors 
132 yeomen, 
be ob-
roTAL 256 in the Field Cryptographic :E'orce for a war 
ih one ocean. 
or a war in two oceans these figures must be doubled. 
At th~ Department we would need a sufficient number of of-
icers and civilian cryptanalysts for administration and for 
raining of personnel. We have no trained personnel atailable 
at the present time <:J.r~d must train the personnel ourselves. I 
ave not the !light.est idea wbere the t ranslatore could he ob-
tained. We are endeavoring to train the nucleus of the Field 
ryptograp hie Force in time of pe s.ce, with tbe idea of training 
the remainder at the Department on mobilization. 
Theee figures do not include the operators for intercept 
stations or radio compass stations. Before we can decipher en-
emy messages. s9me bhe must intercept and copy them. Just now we 
are more backward in this element than in any other. 
Pie.te No. B2 
This is the Imperial Japanese Morse Code or Kana-Code as 
it is sometimes called. The Japanese transmit their language by 
~ans of these characters the same way that we transmit plain 
l~lish by means of the Morse alphabet. There is nothing secret 
about it, no more than there is about the American lviorse Code. 
H~ever there is not an operator in the American Navy today that 
~an copy this code correctly, and there are very few officers in 
the Navy that are aware of its existence. 
Today, the Japanese language affords more protection to 
their messages than our codes do to ours. We broke Code F-3 in 
two months; we broke Code E-4 in twoliiOriths also. It takes three 
years to acquire an elementary knowledge of Japanese and only 
five officers in our Navy have that. 
We have no stations to intercept Japanese radio traffic, 
no operators capable of correctly copying their code, only five 
officers capable of elementary translating, and no officer cap-
able of highly technical translating. We can be thsnkful that 
the other leading Naval Power uses our own language. 
(6) -What material vlill be needed? 
. :Je~elopment and oo.pply of material is a problem for our 
rad10 eng1neers. We must inform them as to what kinds of appara-
tus are needed, the quantity required, and where this apparatus is 





the Basic War ?lans . We must have receiving-sets to cover every 
frequency the enemy may use, automatic recorders, ~arrage re-
ceivers to eliminate interference, powerful amplif1ers, and radio 
compasses capable of covering the whole theatre of war. We must 
have a sufficient number of intercept stations and thew must be 
so located as to cover the whole probable theatre of war, and 
~rovide special stations to cover the enemy's high power shore 
stations. Compare the area of the Pacific Ocean with the area of 
the North Sea und you can visualize the immensity of the task. 
~he War Plans provide for an adequate system of strategic radio 
ompass stations but are deficient in the provision for inter-
apt stations~ The problem of material will probably be solved 
long before we can train an adequate force of ct-yptanalysts. 
(7) - What organizatign is needed? 
We cannot copy any organization used in the World v~ar. 
Vie must work out our own solution along original lines. The 
areas to be covered are so immense that our Radio Intelligence 
Organization must be de-centralized, yet all activities must be 
co-ordinated to avoid duplication of effort. The Atlantic area 
can be controlled directJy from the Navy Department. The Pacific 
area must be controlled from some advanced base, probably Pearl 
Harbor, where our main intercept stations and field code-break-
ng unit should be located. The personnel required to break 
codes in a short time is so great that it is impracticable to put 
them afloat. 
I consider the Field Cr~ptographic Units 
~ral types wi1ich I call Code-breaking Units and 
~ere should be one Code-breaking Unit for each 
or for each c aunt ry with whom we may be at war. 
. · t should ho.ve a miminum complement of 86 men 
22 cryptanalysts, 
4 watch and decoding officers, 
8 translators, 
52 yeomen. 
It should be organized as follows: 
to be of two gen-
Decoding Units. 
theatre of war 
A Code-breaking 
as follows: 
(1) First there should be en Administration ~ection. 
~his Section handles all intercepted messages, sorts 
out, classifies, a.nd distributes them, prepares ex-
tra copies. It does mimeggraph work as necessary 
and handles supplies. ' 
( 2} Next there is a Decoding Section. This Section de-
codes enezey messages for which the keys or the codes 
have been solved, and supplies this information to 
the local command. 
(3) Finally come the Code-breaking Squads. There must 
be one Code-breaking Squad for each code and for 
each cipher system in use by the enemy. The exact 
number needed cannot be predicted. However we 
should provide at least four Code-breaking Squads 
on mobilization. 
The complement of a Code-breaking Squad is as follows: 
1 cryptanalyst, in charge; 




1 tra.nsla tor; 
7 yeomen 
'.i'O~AL of 12 men. This is the minimum force to attack 
a code with any pro~pect of success. 
The Code-breaking Unit provides the Decoding Rnits with 
Reconstructed Enerqyr Codes, Cipher l:eyp, et cetera.. 
The Decoding Units are provided for all the important com-
mands, so that intercepted messages may be read with minimum loss 
of time and so that information may be disseminated with a min-
imum us~ of radio. For a war in the Paotfic, there should be 
Decoding Units on the staffs of the following commands: 
Co~nder-in.Chief, u.s. Fleet; 
Coiiiiilander-in-Ohief ~ Battle Fleet; 
Com.ID£.nder, .3cou ting li'le et; 
Commander, Control Force. 
Commander • E'leet Base Force; 
Commender-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; 
.Any Special Task Force Commarner; 
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District; 
COTILlB.n dan t, Fifteenth Naval Dis trio t: 
Commandant. Sixteenth Naval District. 
The Code-breaking Unit should be located at ?earl Har.bor. 
Its Decoding Section would act as the Decoding Unit far the 
Commandant, 14th Naval District. 
The minimum complement of a Decoding Unit should be as 
follows: 
1 cryptanalyst, 
4 watch and decoding officers, 
4 translators, 
8 yeomen, 
TOTAL 17 nan; 
I have not attempted to cover the organization for intercepting 
ene~ messages. The study of this problem is tao incomplete to 
be of any value • 
. We should, if possible. in peace-tim$, solve all the codes 
and a~phers of probable ~1emy countries so that our entire Radio 
Intelligence Organization may function on mobili~ation. The 
British, in 1914, were thoroughly prepared along these lines. 
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(B) - lf!!ha.t assistance can be given the Field Cryptoiraphic Units 
by the Crypt ogru.phy: Sect ion~!_ the Nav;y_ De~ men t? 
The Cryptography Section must f~rnish the Field Crypto~ . 
grc;ph].c Units wi t']l trained personnel. It must furnish them Wl. t n 
·;he roost advanced methods of attack. It must provide complete 
instruf'!tions. It must furnish the most complete information 
avaiJ.a'ble concerning the enemy codes, ciphers, and communi cat ion 
s;rstam. It must furnish the actual codes and Q iphers if poss-
~-tlR, It ImlSt provide an adequate organiza.t ion and detailed op-
(•ra+.ing plans. It must co-ordinate the activities of the va.rious 
Units during the war. 
However, the actual work of breaking enemy c~ues, sol~ing 
er.emy ciphers, and reading ene nw messages, must be done by the 
Field Cryptographic Units. 
TH:Z Til IRD FUUC~ION OF THE CRYPTOGRAPHY SECTION IS TRAINED 
P~RSoNNEt. 
In peace-time, this is accomplished in two w~ys. Elem-
entary training 1 s carried out by mec:..ns of problems in the 
Jfonthly Communi cation Bulletins". ~'Wo problems are given every 
month; an easy one for beginners and a more advanced one for the 
experienced. :.,.11ese problems are so selected that each problem 
is independent and a man can start at any time, yet th& problems 
are alwa~s of a different type so the whole field of Elementary 
Cryptanalyeis is covered. A war Depertment publication called 
"Elements of Cryptanalysis" is used as a text book. The train-
ing afforded by working out these problems is excellent. They 
are exactly like IJavigation P-works. If we could get the junior 
communication officers on every ship to work these problems, the 
future would almost take care of itself. At present we have 198 
solutions from 72 persons, including commissioned and enlisted 
ersonnel of the Navy, Naval Reserve, l'larine Corps, and Coast 
ard. 
Advanced training is being carried out by a four months' 
course in "Advanced Cryptanalysis'' 6. t the Department. Half of 
the time is allotted to code·breaking; attacking one of our own 
codes. The remainder of the time is allotted to cipher work and 
a study of Radio Intelligence. There are four lJaval officers and 
one ~arine officer in the first class. The Bureau of Navigation 
•ill probably keep two or three officers under instruction in 
these classes for several years •to come. 
Training is difficult because.only a limited few have 
minds suited for this work. Unless a man has natural talent, he 
cannot progress beyond a certain point in Cryptanalysis, anymore 
than he can in musio, or painting or sculpture. It may be neces-
Bary to train fifty officers to get one really first-class 
ryptanalyst. 
In event of war, we expect to conduct a large training 
class of !iaval Reserve Officers, and regular enlisted personnel, 
who have shown special aptitude for this work. l'his will supple-
m~t our peace-time training. 
We must train a sufficient number of officers in peace-time 
to form the skeleton of our Radio Intelligence Orgar..iza t ion, and 
to carry-on alone until they can be re-enforced by trained 
ryptanalysts from .tbe Naval Reserve, 
HE FOUR'?H FUNCliON OF '?HE S:8Ci'IO! IS 3UP.'l:SILL'I.NCE OVER '?HE USE 
OF OUR C'!YPTOGRAPHIC SYSTE1vm. 
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~oding officers, the weaknesaGs of our codes, and discrep2.ncies 
1n our i~straction~. This is now baing done in conjunction with 
the courac in 11J;,drl.unced Crypt~n.·.lysls" . Cases of mi\Jnse of 
codes discovared by the ~epartwcnt Co~unic~tion Office, if of 
unusual n~ture, ure referr~d to thd 3ection for expert opinion. 
T-:1e prevalent misu3e of codes is due in 1:s.rt to inadequate 
instructions. I have just revised ''Notes on the Us~ of Codes and 
Q!E~~1~~ ~nd I hope that it will provide full and aae~uste In-
formation. 
The Sur·veilL.moe over O"tll' radio communic:=.tions vill be ex-
randed trclmendously on the out~reak of war. Each Unit of the 
Fleet anJ each naval District Nill l1ave its o·.vn Surveillance Of-
ficers, who will have no C.utiea other thd.n studying the r::...dio 
traific of their org~nization to detect misuse of coues mid ci-
phers or discrepencies of :=.ny n,.utre. The Department will super-
vi ee and ''check-up" tr.e ·;vor k of these su.rYeillance officers in 
ord e:r to deny the enemy in ever:l po Stji ble rna.nner, roo ans of at-
tack on our secret 1!letH3a5es. In conjunction with Surveillance 
duties, these officers will be charged witt the prepc.ration of 
duwnw mese~ges, with instruction of personnel in tae proper use 
of ~~des 2nd ciphers, and with all other elements of Radio Se-
c:urity. 
THE FI.b,~h FUUCTIOU OF ::'HE S3C~IClJ, ~EE l:OST INTBRi'JST!NG OF AJ.~L, 
IS ;rym:;~:n~G otT .i<'OlEIG!f SY3TE1.:S.-
I ~egret th[.t I am not J.t liberty to di~cuss this work. 
All I C911 say is that the resnl ts accomplished to date are very 
gratifyiue- indeed. 
It m~y ~eem that I have painted a rather black picture of 
the Nav~'s Radio Intelligence. I have s.imply triej to describe 
actual conditions. The Bx·iti sh Navy has a sturt of 15 years, 
4 Jrears' war experience, o.nd a large force of highly skilled raen 
and women. 
~he United States Army has a 7 years' start, 2 years' war 
e~Jerience, and a large force of cryptanulysts in the Rcser~e 
Corps. 
The Navy hc.s no past e:::periGnce to guide it, it bas no 
raserve to supply personnel; but it does ~laim the future. We 
J.re devoting greatex efforts to Rad iOTritelligen ce than any other 
service, so far as I know; we are making wonderful progress· and 
I belie·ve that within five years our :tadio Intelligence Organi-
zation will be the best in the world . 
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